India Balances Russia and West | UPSC

India Balances Russia and West

Syllabus

GS 2: India and its Neighbourhood

Why in the News?

Recently, the 2026 SCO and BRICS summits highlighted India’s changing diplomatic approach towards Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and Western powers, raising questions about its traditional policy of strategic autonomy.

Introduction

• The 2026 SCO and BRICS summits revealed important changes in India’s foreign policy.
• India supported a declaration defending Iran and publicly urged Russia to end its war in Ukraine.
• These steps reflected competing diplomatic pressures.
• They also raised questions about India’s relationships with Russia, China, Israel, and the United States.

Importance of the SCO and BRICS Summits

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31–September 1, 2026.
• The BRICS summit followed in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, attracting attention because of India’s diplomatic decisions.
• Iran received greater support and attention from members of both organisations than many observers had expected.
• Traditionally, these summits have allowed Russia, India, and China to display cooperation despite their different international interests.
• Russia uses these platforms to show Western countries that it retains powerful partners and has not become diplomatically isolated.
• China’s role in expanding the SCO and BRICS demonstrates its growing influence in international affairs.
• India uses both organisations to demonstrate strategic autonomy, meaning independent decisions based on its national interests.
• New Delhi has traditionally participated in Western and non-Western forums, including the G7, SCO, and BRICS.

India’s Unexpected Shift at Bishkek

Support for Iran

• At Bishkek, India supported the Bishkek Declaration, which criticised attacks against Iran as violations of international law.
• The declaration reaffirmed Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while mourning the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
• Khamenei was killed in US-Israeli air strikes on February 28, 2026, according to the supplied account.
• Although the declaration did not explicitly identify the United States or Israel, its criticism clearly referred to their actions.
• By endorsing the declaration, India signalled opposition to military attacks against Iran and supported its territorial integrity.

A Different Approach Towards Israel

• India had generally avoided directly condemning American or Israeli military actions against Iran, despite Iran’s membership in both organisations.
• New Delhi had also avoided explicitly accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, while supporting certain United Nations ceasefire resolutions.
• India had reaffirmed its support for Palestinian statehood, even while publicly expressing solidarity with Israel.
• Indian diplomats had often tried to soften criticism of Washington and Tel Aviv during discussions in international forums.
• However, the Bishkek and Delhi declarations contained strong criticism of Israel and firm support for Palestinian rights.
• Both declarations also reaffirmed the two-state solution, which envisions Israel and an independent Palestine living alongside each other.

Why India May Have Changed Its Position

• One explanation is that India wanted to avoid upsetting Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping before hosting BRICS.
• Their participation was important because their absence could have seriously weakened the diplomatic importance of India’s BRICS presidency.
• Since Operation Sindoor in 2025, India has faced growing perceptions of diplomatic marginalisation, according to the supplied analysis.
• Pakistan, meanwhile, gained diplomatic prominence after Washington selected Islamabad as a mediator in the conflict involving Iran.
• Several Gulf countries also sought defence agreements with Pakistan, increasing its diplomatic visibility in the region.
• India therefore needed a successful, high-profile BRICS summit to strengthen its international standing and demonstrate diplomatic relevance.
• The summit’s successful completion helped India maintain its position within an important forum representing emerging and developing economies.

India’s Mixed Signals on Russia and Ukraine

Appeasing Different Partners

• India’s support for the Iran declaration did not mean that it had completely abandoned its relationship with Washington.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s public appeal to Putin to end Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine sent another diplomatic message.
• Had the appeal been intended solely for Moscow, Modi could have communicated it privately rather than publicly.
• Its public delivery may therefore have reassured Western governments that India remained concerned about Russia’s military campaign.
• India supported a collective position on Iran while appearing closer to Western concerns about Ukraine than previously.
• These moves reveal the difficulty of maintaining relationships with partners whose interests frequently conflict.

Challenge of Multi-Alignment

• India wants to maintain ties with Israel while opposing military attacks against Iran and protecting regional stability.
• It also seeks access to Russian oil while strengthening cooperation with Western countries over international security issues.
• At the same time, India wants to remain influential within BRICS and the SCO without appearing part of an anti-American alliance.
• This balancing strategy is known as multi-alignment, through which India engages different powers according to its interests.
• Growing international tensions are making this approach more difficult, particularly when partners expect clear political support.
• India’s choices may consequently create dissatisfaction in both Moscow and Beijing, despite its efforts to preserve cooperation.

India, China and the Ukraine Question

• Modi and Xi did not hold bilateral talks during the SCO summit in Bishkek, but met alongside the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
• Their meeting took place before Xi’s high-profile G2 summit with US President Donald Trump in Washington in September 2026.
• Neither the SCO nor BRICS summit declaration mentioned the Ukraine war, avoiding direct criticism of Russia.
• India therefore supported two declarations that accommodated Russia’s position without fully endorsing Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine.

Russia’s Concerns About India’s Public Statements

Earlier Message at Samarkand

• Russia may view Modi’s latest appeal as another example of what critics describe as performative diplomacy at Moscow’s expense.
• At Samarkand on September 16, 2022, Modi told Putin that the present period was not an era for war.
• External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar later repeated this message in Western capitals to explain India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil.
• His argument was that buying Russian oil did not automatically mean India politically supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Questions About Consistency

• Critics may question why Modi has not used comparable public language towards Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Israel has conducted military operations across several parts of West Asia, with some countries and territories attacked repeatedly.
• The supplied passage also alleges that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, a highly contested legal and political issue.
• Modi has likewise not publicly directed the same warning towards Trump following American attacks on Iran.
• India itself conducted military action against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, adding another complication to claims of consistent opposition to war.
• Moscow may therefore interpret Modi’s statements as diplomatic messaging intended partly to reassure Western governments rather than express a universal principle.
• His latest call for an end to the seemingly endless Ukraine war could strengthen that Russian interpretation.
• This raises questions about whether Modi would deliver similar public messages to Trump over Iran or Netanyahu over Gaza.

Future of India–Russia Relations

Continuing Mutual Dependence

• Russia still needs India as a major buyer of its oil and military equipment, at least in the near term.
• India, however, has gradually reduced its dependence on Russian weapons by purchasing more equipment from France, Israel, and the United States.
• These developments indicate that India–Russia relations remain important but are becoming increasingly transactional.
• Their partnership is also vulnerable to differences over international conflicts, strategic priorities, and relations with other major powers.

Russia’s Growing Dependence on China

• Moscow is moving closer to China, which it regards as a trusted strategic partner amid tensions with Western countries.
• Meanwhile, India’s efforts to maintain favour in Washington may weaken the longstanding trust underpinning its relationship with Russia.
• India must therefore consider whether short-term diplomatic gains could create longer-term difficulties with an established strategic partner.

Conclusion

India must balance its partnerships without weakening its credibility. Consistent principles, careful diplomacy, and strategic independence can protect its interests while preserving cooperation with Russia, the West, and other emerging powers.

Source: The Hindu

Mains Practice Question

Examine the role of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment in shaping India’s relations with major global powers.