BRICS Faces Internal Challenges and Growing Divisions

BRICS Faces Internal Challenges

Syllabus

GS 2: India and its neighbourhood

Why in the News?

Recently, India’s 18th BRICS Summit offers an opportunity to restore cohesion, protect consensus, and revive global institutional reform. It can also prevent geopolitical capture and strengthen practical cooperation among members.

Introduction

• BRICS began as a platform for emerging economies seeking greater influence in global governance and fairer institutions.
• Its expansion has created tensions, competing geopolitical visions, and internal conflicts.
• India’s 2026 presidency offers an important chance to restore cohesion, strengthen reform, preserve strategic flexibility, and advance shared interests effectively among members.

BRICS and Its Original Purpose

• BRICS originally brought together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to increase emerging economies’ global voice.
• The grouping especially sought greater representation in global financial and economic institutions and promoted a fairer multilateral order.
• India initially strongly supported BRICS because it viewed the grouping as useful for genuine institutional reforms.
• India hosted the fourth BRICS Summit in 2012 under the theme “Global Stability, Security and Prosperity.”
• This theme reflected BRICS’ potential to address wider geopolitical issues beyond economics and finance.
• India’s presidency contributed to establishing the New Development Bank, popularly known as the BRICS Bank.
• India later introduced other initiatives, including stronger cooperation against terrorism through a dedicated BRICS counter-terrorism framework.

China’s Expanding Influence

• China gradually viewed BRICS as a counterweight to Western dominance and sought to use it for wider strategic ambitions.
• BRICS countries represented nearly 20% of global GDP in 2010, giving China an influential platform among emerging economies.
• China promoted mechanisms such as BRICS-Plus and BRICS Outreach to strengthen engagement with Global South countries.
• These mechanisms could help China build support for a second major global power centre.
• India consequently faced a dual challenge involving multilateral reform and resistance to China’s growing influence.
• India, Brazil, and South Africa realised that China supported institutional reform selectively when reforms served its interests.
• China resisted their efforts to secure permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, exposing this selective approach.
• India therefore increasingly focused on internal BRICS consolidation and cooperation to prevent excessive Chinese dominance.
• India’s 2026 chairship rests on Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability, guided by “Humanity First” and people-centred cooperation.

Protecting the Consensus Principle

• BRICS depended heavily on consensus, because unanimous decisions helped preserve cooperation among countries with different strategic interests.
• India and Brazil feared BRICS could resemble the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where majority decisions might overpower dissenting members.
• The 2019 BRICS Summit in Brasilia therefore included only the five original members without additional invited countries.
• However, Russia’s 2020 presidency witnessed a reported non-consensus statement concerning COVID-19, weakening this established principle.
• The May 2026 BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting again produced non-consensus documents because newer members could not reach agreement.
• Frequent use of such documents could weaken BRICS’ effectiveness and eventually undermine its institutional credibility.

Expansion Creates New Challenges

• China strongly supported expanding both the New Development Bank and BRICS membership, despite resistance from India and Brazil.
• BRICS now includes 11 members, following the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
• The expanded grouping also has 10 partner countries, significantly increasing its geographical and political diversity.
• India’s earlier concerns have gained relevance because several newer members have serious disputes among themselves.
• Original members also face disagreements, but they generally attempt to manage differences for the grouping’s larger interests.
• New bilateral conflicts could paralyse BRICS in a manner similar to the problems experienced by SAARC.
• India therefore needs to prevent bilateral disputes from overwhelming BRICS’ broader economic and political objectives.

Non-West Versus Anti-West

• India wants BRICS to remain a non-Western platform, rather than becoming an explicitly anti-Western geopolitical alliance.
• Some members increasingly favour an anti-Western orientation because of growing rivalry between China and the United States.
• Russia’s continuing war with Ukraine and Iran’s conflict with the United States and Israel further complicate BRICS’ position.
• Brazil and India have also faced punitive tariffs imposed by United States President Donald Trump.
• The United States Congress is considering legislation allowing punitive tariffs against countries importing Russian oil.
• These developments make India’s balancing approach increasingly difficult amid wider tensions involving the Quad, Pakistan, and India-US relations.
• The United States has courted Pakistan while India-US relations face pressure, further complicating India’s strategic calculations.
• Western actions affecting global institutions may encourage BRICS members to adopt a stronger anti-Western position.
• However, many members still prefer engagement with multiple global powers instead of aligning completely with China and Russia.
• Their objective is institutional change without a complete geopolitical realignment, providing space for India’s balanced approach.

US-China Rivalry and Parallel Global Systems

• The larger concern involves China and the United States developing competing global visions outside traditional internationally negotiated frameworks.
• Both powers increasingly influence emerging standards involving Artificial Intelligence, digital governance, Internet regulation, data ownership, and state control.
• Competition also extends to 5G, 6G, telecommunications, satellite navigation, and electric vehicles, creating parallel technological ecosystems.
• Neither country appears primarily focused on reforming existing institutions, increasing pressure on the established global order.
• China recently established the World AI Cooperation Organisation in Shanghai, adding another parallel international initiative.
• Other Chinese initiatives include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Belt and Road Initiative, and Digital Silk Road.
• These initiatives challenge traditional Bretton Woods institutions through alternative financing, infrastructure, technology, and governance models.
• China sees BRICS as one possible platform for advancing these broader international objectives.

India’s Concern Over De-Dollarisation

• China has promoted de-dollarisation, including proposals for a BRICS currency, but several members remain cautious about such plans.
• Many countries fear a renminbi-dominated currency and instead favour practical payment connectivity between existing national systems.
• Preferred alternatives include linked payment systems, central bank digital currencies, and transactions using national currencies.
• China is formally launching mBridge after its successful pilot, offering an alternative cross-border financial payment system.
• India does not want BRICS to develop into another Bretton Woods-style system dominated by Chinese financial influence.

India Can Course-Correct BRICS

• The 2026 New Delhi Summit provides India an important opportunity to restore BRICS’ original purpose and improve cohesion.
• India has worked to persuade newer members to manage political disputes and focus on common institutional interests.
• In a rapidly changing world, India should revive BRICS as a platform for reform, stability, and Global South cooperation.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi first articulated the idea of “reformed multilateralism” at the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa.
• By 2019, India, Brazil, and South Africa helped include this vision within the Brasilia Summit document.
• India should now place reformed multilateralism at the centre of BRICS’ future agenda.

BRICS as a Global South Platform

• BRICS can become an important organisation representing Global South middle powers seeking greater influence without rigid geopolitical alignment.
• A Western-oriented middle-power grouping discussed at Davos cannot fully represent the interests of developing economies.
• BRICS has greater potential to provide such representation, despite serious internal weaknesses and an imperfect membership structure.
• China is not conventionally a middle power, yet its disproportionate influence creates an important structural challenge within BRICS.
• India and China therefore need greater cooperation on emerging global issues while carefully managing their bilateral differences.
• Several important middle powers are still absent, showing that BRICS’ membership remains incomplete and imperfect.
• Nevertheless, BRICS possesses substantial geopolitical and geo-economic potential because many countries increasingly seek membership.
• India should proactively promote BRICS reform because doing nothing could allow other powers to reshape its future direction.

Conclusion

India must use BRICS to promote reform, stability, and Global South interests without allowing geopolitical rivalry to dominate. A balanced BRICS can strengthen India’s multi-alignment, strategic autonomy, global influence, and long-term diplomatic options globally today.

Source: The Hindu

Mains Practice Question

BRICS was created to promote greater representation in global governance. Examine how its expansion has affected its original objectives.