Politics of Insurgency: Decline of Naxalism

THE POLITICS OF INSURGENCY, THE DECLINE OF NAXALISM

Why in the News?

  • Recent discourse on terrorism highlights a contrast: while global doomsday predictions warn of rising threats, India is witnessing a decline in militancy and ideologically-driven terrorism.
  • Historically, predictions have often been unreliable, with few proving accurate.
  • In the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI), growing uncertainty makes forecasting even more hazardous.
  • The safest prediction across history has usually been continuity — that things will remain much the same.
  • Political leaders are cautioned to exercise restraint in speculative predictions and focus on grounded realities.

Politics of Insurgency: Decline of Naxalism

A Case of Contrasts

Global Concerns

  • Even 25 years after 9/11, terrorism remains a persistent threat.
  • Several copycat killings and IS-inspired vehicle ramming attacks have been reported, with the most publicised recent case in New Orleans (Jan 1, 2025).
  • IS had earlier orchestrated multiple similar attacks across Europe.
  • Jihadist groups are believed to be intensifying their terror campaigns globally.
  • Online campaigns continue to incite ‘lone wolf’ attacks.
  • Anti-Israel protests worldwide are being exploited by IS and al-Qaeda to fuel their propaganda and recruitment.

Emerging Doomsday Predictions

  • Future terrorists are predicted to be more violent and destructive than before.
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI) is seen as a new enabler of terrorism.
    • Concerns include AI-assisted terror operations.
    • Possible terrorist access to biological weapons could cause mass killings.
    • Risks of misaligned AI escaping human control, unleashing unpredictable harm.

Indian Scenario: A Declining Curve

  • Contrary to global trends, India is witnessing a decline in ideologically-oriented terrorism.
  • The Naxalite/Maoist movement is on a downward trajectory.
  • Union Home Minister has indicated that Naxalism may end by mid-2026, for the first time officially predicting its demise.
  • Earlier phases had witnessed ‘false dawns’, but no formal declaration of end until now.

The Rise and Fall of Naxalism

  • Initially, the movement inspired by revolutionary zeal (1960s–70s) drew students, intellectuals, and youth.
  • Leaders included Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Satyanarayan Singh, and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah.
  • Once hailed as a movement of the oppressed — tribals and urban poor — it degenerated into mindless violence.
  • The revolutionary fervour evaporated as the movement split into regional factions, losing its all-India character.
  • It became concentrated in forested and hilly belts of central India (Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh).

The Early Promise

  • The Naxalite uprising was termed ‘Spring Thunder Over India’, echoing Maoist China.
  • Leaders like Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevara were inspirations.
  • Charu Mazumdar was hailed as “the new Messiah”, with slogans like “China’s Chairman is our Chairman.”
  • Despite initial enthusiasm, the promise faded as the movement failed to sustain itself.

The Campaign Against Naxalism

Security Offensive (2024 onwards)

  • Under directions of the Union Home Minister, a sustained nationwide offensive was launched against Naxalite groups.
  • Thousands of militants are reported killed in encounters (figures vary).
  • CPI (Maoist) booklet admitted 357 Naxalites killed in 2024 alone, with over one-third being women cadres.

Epicentre of Violence

  • Main theatre of operations: Dandakaranya region, covering
    • Bastar (Chhattisgarh)
    • Gadchiroli (Maharashtra)
    • Parts of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh.
  • Naxalites’ decline accelerated due to:
    • Territorial shrinkage
    • Internal factionalism
    • Leadership crises, especially after removal of Lakshman Rao alias Ganapathi (2018).

Comparisons with U.S. ‘War on Terror’

  • Parallels drawn with Donald Trump’s war on terror during his second presidency.
  • But key differences:
    • S. offensive targeted Jihadist groups with no ideological base beyond hostility to the U.S. (“Great Satan”).
    • Indian offensive is against Naxalites embedded within local communities, projecting themselves as defenders of the oppressed.
    • Use of brute force in India has historically been restrained, with checks and balances on deadly force.

Strategic Approach in India

  • Objective: Prevent revolutionary groups, however ideological, from disturbing the established democratic order.
  • Recognition that early Naxalites were driven by revolutionary zeal and democratic ideals.
  • Over time, ideology degenerated into indiscriminate violence, though groups continued to maintain a veneer of ideological justification.

A New Term

Misuse of ‘Urban Naxals’

  • The term ‘urban naxals’ is often misapplied, leading to a distorted view of the original Naxalite movement.
  • The ‘Spring Thunder Over India’ (late 1960s) had clear ideological principles (though misdirected) and was rooted in Marxist-Leninist philosophy with a defined structure.

Original Naxalites vs. Today’s ‘Urban Naxals’

  • Original Naxalites:
    • Structured, ideologically driven, revolutionary zeal.
    • Connected with masses — tribals, peasants, and the urban poor.
  • Today’s ‘Urban Naxals’:
    • A loose group of intellectuals.
    • Critical of government actions and policies.
    • Lack ideological and organizational resemblance to the original Naxal movement.

Risks of Wrong Classification

  • Mislabeling and oversimplification can have unintended consequences.
  • Failure to identify real issues may magnify risks rather than solve them.
  • Policies based on cognitive bias or blind spots can lead to high hidden costs.
  • Requires a nuanced understanding of the factors at play.

Source: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-politics-of-insurgency-the-decline-of-naxalism/article69937785.ece

Mains Question (250 words)

“Critically examine the misuse of the term ‘Urban Naxals’ in contemporary discourse. How does misclassification distort understanding of ideological movements and hinder effective policy responses to internal security challenges?”