Divide Supreme Court to Strengthen It | Reform

TO STRENGTHEN THE SUPREME COURT, DIVIDE IT

Why in the News?

  • In 2016, three Supreme Court judges raised concerns over the increasing burden of ordinary appeals on the Supreme Court, resulting in the neglect of its primary constitutional responsibilities.
  • They framed 11 questions on the issue and referred the matter to a larger Bench, but the reference remains unheard even after a decade.
  • The debate has renewed calls for restructuring the Supreme Court into two separate institutions:
    • A dedicated Constitutional Court to deal with constitutional matters and substantial questions of law.
    • Regional Courts of Appeal to handle ordinary appellate cases and reduce the Supreme Court’s mounting backlog.

TO STRENGTHEN THE SUPREME COURT, DIVIDE IT

More about the news

Mounting Pendency and Case Backlog

  • As of December 2025, the Supreme Court had 92,318 pending cases, its highest-ever backlog, nearly 10,000 more than the previous year.
  • The increasing caseload cannot be effectively addressed merely by increasing the number of judges.

Proposed Two-Tier Judicial Structure

  • Establish a Constitutional Court (around 11 judges) in Delhi to exclusively hear:
    • Constitutional matters.
    • Substantial questions of law.
  • Establish four to five Regional Courts of Appeal to handle ordinary appellate cases.
  • The objective is to ensure specialisation and distinguish cases involving constitutional interpretation from routine individual disputes.

Declining Constitutional Function of the Supreme Court

  • In the first half of the 1960s, Constitution Benches decided an average of 134 cases annually.
  • This figure has declined to fewer than 10 cases annually over the last decade.
  • Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s docket has increasingly been dominated by Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) under Article 136, which were originally intended to serve as an exceptional remedy.
  • SLPs accounted for 6% of the Supreme Court’s admission docket in 2011.

Departure from Its Original Constitutional Mandate

  • The Supreme Court, originally envisaged as the final authority on constitutional matters, has increasingly become a general appellate court (fourth tier of appeal).
  • In Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India (1986), a Constitution Bench headed by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that the Supreme Court was never intended to function as an ordinary court of appeal.

Beyond the Backlog: Arguments in Favour of a Two-Tier Supreme Court

Specialisation and Judicial Efficiency

  • The objective of restructuring is not merely to reduce pendency but to introduce specialisation and functional division of judicial work.
  • A two-tier structure would provide:
    • Constitutional Court: Dedicated to constitutional matters and substantial questions of law, enabling full-Bench hearings and consistent, authoritative judgments.
    • Regional Courts of Appeal: Handling ordinary appellate cases, ensuring faster disposal and improving access to justice.
  • It would bring the final tier of ordinary justice closer to citizens.
  • It follows a pyramid-shaped judicial structure, where the apex court decides fewer but significant cases, while lower appellate courts handle a larger volume of cases.

Institutional and Legislative Support in India

  • 229th Law Commission Report (2009): Proposed a Constitution Bench in Delhi along with four regional Cassation Benches.
  • Parliamentary Standing Committee (2023): Recommended the establishment of regional Benches.
  • The Union Law Ministry has accepted the recommendation.

International Models of Specialised Apex Courts

  • USA: The Supreme Court sits above 13 Federal Courts of Appeals and hears only a small proportion of cases.
  • South Africa: Follows a two-court structure:
    • Constitutional Court in Johannesburg.
    • Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein for other appellate matters.
  • Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe exclusively handles constitutional matters, while specialised federal courts deal with other areas of law.

Brazil: A Relevant Example of Judicial Restructuring

  • Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal earlier performed the dual function of constitutional adjudication and hearing ordinary federal appeals.
  • The 1988 Constitution established a separate Superior Tribunal of Justice to take over the appellate workload.
  • However, merely separating judicial functions did not eliminate pendency.

Need for a Case-Filtering Mechanism

  • Brazil’s experience highlights that structural separation must be accompanied by a mechanism to filter cases.
  • USA: The Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction and grants review to roughly 1% of the 7,000 petitions it receives annually. This power has existed since 1925.
  • Brazil: Following a 2004 reform, constitutional appeals are entertained only when the issue involves general repercussion beyond the parties concerned.
  • A similar filtering mechanism is necessary to prevent the proposed Constitutional Court from becoming another overcrowded institution.

Constitutional Feasibility of the Reform

  • The 229th Law Commission Report suggested that Article 130 of the Constitution may permit the establishment of regional Benches without a constitutional amendment.
  • This could allow the initial steps towards judicial restructuring to be undertaken by the Supreme Court itself, without waiting for Parliamentary approval.

Concerns and Arguments Against Splitting the Supreme Court

  • Dilution of the Supreme Court’s institutional authority:
    • Successive Chief Justices have expressed concerns that dividing constitutional and appellate functions may undermine the Supreme Court’s identity as a single, unified apex institution.
  • Creation of a perceived judicial hierarchy:
    • Regional Courts of Appeal may be viewed as inferior forums compared to the Constitutional Court in Delhi.
  • Forum-shopping and increased litigation:
    • Litigants may seek to approach the Delhi-based apex court rather than accept decisions of regional appellate courts.
  • Loss of institutional indivisibility:
    • The authority of an apex court partly derives from its position as the final judicial forum, with no higher court or rival institution to challenge its decisions.

Restoring the Supreme Court: Counterarguments to Concerns over Division

Existing Fragmentation of the Supreme Court

  • The argument that splitting the Supreme Court would undermine its unity overlooks the fact that it is already functioning through multiple small Benches.
  • These Benches sometimes deliver contradictory judgments, creating inconsistencies in judicial interpretation.
  • Constitutional matters receive limited attention, with only a handful of Constitution Bench hearings annually.

Increasing Pendency Despite Expansion of Judicial Strength

  • Increasing the number of judges alone has failed to address the growing backlog.
  • Key developments:
    • 2019: Supreme Court’s sanctioned strength increased to 34 judges, when pendency was around 60,000 cases.
    • 2025: Pendency reached nearly 93,000 cases.
    • 2025: The Court disposed of 65,615 cases against 75,410 fresh cases received.
    • 2026: Parliament further increased the sanctioned strength to 38 judges.
  • This indicates that structural reforms and specialisation are necessary alongside increasing judicial capacity.

Restoring the Original Constitutional Mandate

  • The Supreme Court, which delivered landmark judgments such as the Basic Structure Doctrine, has increasingly been occupied with routine appellate matters.
  • Its primary constitutional function has been weakened due to the overwhelming volume of ordinary cases.
  • A separate Constitutional Court would:
    • Restore the Supreme Court’s focus on constitutional interpretation.
    • Ensure consistent and authoritative constitutional rulings.
    • Strengthen its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

Strengthening Access to Justice

  • Regional Courts of Appeal would bring appellate justice closer to ordinary litigants.
  • They would facilitate faster disposal of routine appeals and reduce the burden on the Constitutional Court.
  • Thus, judicial restructuring would not diminish the Supreme Court’s authority but restore its constitutional significance while improving access to timely justice.

Source: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/to-strengthen-the-supreme-court-divide-it/article71698099.ece

Mains question

“Examine the need for restructuring the Supreme Court of India into a Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal. How can such a reform improve judicial efficiency, constitutional adjudication and access to justice?” (15 Marks, 250 Words)