A long-drawn test for India’s diplomatic skills

Context

Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarks on a week-long journey to Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia from May 19. That defines that at present, India is at its peak of geopolitical activities.

The Planned meetings

Visits to Japan, Papua New Guinea and Australia from May 19 to 24, as announced by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Visit to the Japanese city of Hiroshima for the G7 summit.
Then from Japan to Port Moresby to host the third summit of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation jointly with the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.
Thereafter visit to Sydney in Australia from May 22 to 24 to attend the Quad summit.
Almost immediately after his return, the PM will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit scheduled for July 3-4.
A week after the SCO summit, the PM will pivot back to the European Union, as chief guest at France’s national “Bastille day” parade.
The PM will engage with the leaders of Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa in the BRICS summit in August.
In September he will host the G-20 summit in Delhi.

Significance of these geopolitical activities:

For a very long time India has been on the sidelines of world politics. She has been often seen as an irritant by great powers for even having an opinion.
But now India’s pivotal position at the G-20, the Quad (the United States, India, Australia and Japan), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Global South today has given it a sudden surge in stature and reputation.
But one year is too short in geopolitics, and geopolitics is not always a function of happy coincidences.
For New Delhi, thus, this is its moment under the sun, the near realisation of a long-awaited pivotal power moment.

Striking a balance

The timing of these engagements is no accident; nor is it explained by India’s traditional adherence to the principle of non-alignment.
It is to India’s credit that it continues to maintain this balance, and is being courted by countries across the global divide, even as it seeks to hold out against two nuclear-armed land neighbours at its frontiers.
India had managed to maintain it’s “sweet spot” without needing to follow Indonesian President’s example in travelling to Kiev, or inviting Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address the G-20, in order to strike a balance on the war.
While India’s attempts at being a “balancing force” are playing out much more visibly. Clearly, autonomous strategy or multi-alignment has paid off for India in this critical year.

Disturbing the balance

There are a few unlikely “black swan” events that could jolt India off its careful tightrope walk and force a rethink of its policies one way or the other.
A sudden success for Ukraine in its much-delayed, upcoming spring offensive, for example, would require New Delhi to reconsider its unalloyed ties with Moscow.
Any major aggression by China across any part of the Line of Actual Control would be another such event requiring a strategic overhaul.
India may also be forced to rethink if Russia turns more belligerent over the payment problem or withhold supplies of defence hardware to India under pressure from China.
Equally, any decision by the U.S. and Europe to “force a choice” on India: to go forward with unilateral sanctions for the increase in Russian oil inflows or through the old threat of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act-Related Sanctions (CAATSA) for India’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile systems.
In the absence of these ‘at present unlikely’ scenarios, India is likely to continue to try to work its interests on both sides of the geopolitical fence.

Conclusion

As the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and evolve, India needs to adapt its diplomacy to navigate the changing dynamics effectively. The deepening partnership between Russia and China requires India to reassess its strategic relationships and adopt a flexible approach in dealing with both traditional and emerging partners.

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